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When we talk, discuss, or try to persuade our interlocutor, we leave most of 
the information needed to communicate implicit: we simply presuppose it 
(Saeed 2000: 103; Wilson 1975: 26). We never remind our interlocutor of 
the definitions of the words that we use; we never describe people, things or 
places that we think our interlocutor may know. We draw conclusions from 
conditional premises that we very rarely express; we take turns in speaking 
and prove a point without telling why we act in such a fashion, or declaring 
the rules governing our discussion. How is it linguistically possible to leave 
all such information implicit? How can we perform communication moves 
leaving whole propositions unexpressed?
The problem of the implicit grounds of dialogue is twofold: it is a 
linguistic matter, as presuppositions are the conditions of meaning, but also 
an epistemic problem, as we cannot take everything for granted, and we 
cannot actually know our interlocutor’s knowledge. These two dimensions 
are related to a third one, the dialogical and argumentative use of 
presupposition. We can take something for granted because our interlocutor 
can understand our communicative intent by retrieving or reconstructing 
the presupposed propositions. However, by presupposing we also commit 
him to such propositions; he, therefore, needs to have criteria to evaluate the 
reasonableness and acceptability of presuppositions.
The purpose of this paper is to show how crucial the relation between 
reasoning and presupposition is. On this perspective, presuppositions can be 
analyzed from an argumentative point of view as the result and the triggers 
of processes of reasoning that can and need to be assessed. Interpreting 
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presuppo sitions in terms of reasoning can explain why presupposing can 
be used to deceive, hide, or mislead the interlocutor, and why some uses of 
the so-called emotive, loaded or slanted words can be extremely powerful 
instruments.
1. Presuppositions and meaningfulness constraints
Presuppositions have been usually considered as conditions of verification 
of a sentence (see Wilson 1975): for instance, if the referent of the subject 
of a sentence does not exist, the sentence cannot be true or false (such as, 
for instance in the famous example, “The king of France is bald”). However, 
as reference can be only determined in context, presupposition is a property 
not of sentences, but of the use of sentences, or statements (Strawson 1950; 
1952; Karttunen 1973; Wilson 1975; Keenan 1971). If we consider not 
sentences but utterances, presuppositions need to be defined as conditions 
of meaningfulness of speech acts; on this perspective, presuppositional 
failure will result in the failure of a speech act to carry out its intended effect 
on the audience (Grice 1975; Grice 1989: 220; Levinson 1983: 97). This 
social dimension of meaningfulness and presupposition was underscored 
by Austin, who pointed out how the falsity of presuppositions causes the 
infelicity of a speech act:
Next let us consider presupposition: what is to be said of the statement that 
“John’s children are all bald” if made when John has no children? It is usual 
now to say that it is not false because it is devoid of reference; reference 
is necessary for either truth or falsehood. (Is it then meaningless? It is not 
so in every sense: it is not, like a “meaningless sentence”, ungrammatical, 
incomplete, mumbo-jumbo, & c.) People say “the question does not arise”. 
Here I shall say “the utterance is void”. (Austin 1962: 50-51)
In Austin’s example, the speaker is presupposing that there is a person 
called John, and that he has children. We can notice that the speaker is not 
presupposing the existence of such entities, but simply their existence in the 
listener’s domain of knowledge.
This pragmatic view extends the notion of presupposition to several 
phenomena of meaningfulness constraints (Austin 1965: 34; 51), such 
as selectional restrictions, coherence relations and felicity conditions. 
Selectional restrictions can be described as the conditions that a lexical 
item (or predicate—see Hobbs 1979: 70; Grimes 1975: 162) imposes 
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on the elements acting as its arguments. Such conditions represent the 
categorical presuppositions of the predicate (McCawley 1971: 290; Antley 
1974; Chomsky 1971: 205), that is, the categorical conditions imposed 
on the denotation of a semantic structure. For instance, the predicate “to 
kill” presupposes an animate being as a second argument; therefore, the 
second argument needs to denote an animate being. Also the conditions 
that a communicative intention imposes on its argument (Austin 1962: 30) 
can be described as presuppositions. For instance, just as I can “inform” 
someone only if he can understand the fact or event I am talking of, placing 
it in a certain place and at a certain time, I cannot perform the speech act 
of “appointing” someone if I am not entitled to do so, or if the person that 
I want to appoint has already been appointed, or is not a person (Austin 
1962: 34, 51). A speech act, therefore, imposes a set of presuppositions 
on the sentence and the context (constructed in a broad sense to include 
the interlocutors) in which it is uttered (see Vanderveken & Searle 1985: 
66-67). Finally, presuppositions can also refer to the conditions imposed 
by higher level predicates connecting the discourse moves. On Grimes’ 
view, sentences are organized in a coherent way in a text because they 
are aimed at carrying out a dialogical (or communicative) intention (see 
also Grice 1975: 45). Grimes (1975: 209ff.) referred to the interlocutors’ 
communicative intentions as “rhetorical predicates”, which were later 
named “logical-semantic connectives” (Rigotti 2005) or “coherence 
relations” (Hobbs 1979: 68; Hobbs 1985). On this latter perspective, 
intentions are conceived as abstract predicates representing a dialogical 
purpose, such as explanation, alternative, support, etc. Such predicates, 
or relations, connect discourse sequences in two similar fashions, through 
subordination or coordination. In the first case the predicate is explicit 
and imposes a set of coherence conditions, or pragmatic presuppositions 
(Vanderveken 2002: 47; Bach 2003: 163), on its arguments (Grimes 
1975: 162). In the second case, an explicit or implicit predicate hides a 
deeper relationship (Ballard, Conrad & Longacre 1971) that needs to be 
reconstructed in order to understand the role and the conditions of the 
discourse segments or sequences. For instance, coordination can express 
temporal, causal, explanation relations, imposing specific requirements on 
their sequences. For instance, in causal relations one sequence needs to be 
the cause of the other; in temporal relations, the sentences need to represent 
actions in a specific temporal order. From a pragmatic perspective, such 
relations can be considered as high-level speech acts (Grice 1989: 362; 
Carston 2002: 107-108), indicating the role of the first level speech acts, 
or rather, their felicity conditions (Vanderveken 2002: 28).
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All such types of meaningfulness conditions can be described in 
dialogical terms: the speaker subordinates at different levels the felicity 
of his speech acts to the listener’s knowledge or acceptance of certain 
conditions, which can be epistemic, categorical, or pragmatic (discursive) 
in nature. This account of presupposition is bound to a dialogical notion 
of meaning as a direction or purpose of a communicative exchange (Grice 
1975: 45).
2. Presuming knowledge 
Presuppositions describe the conditions of the use of a sentence in a dialogue, 
even though they may be triggered by its semantic or syntactic structure, 
and may be used correctly or lead to acts which are void. However, what 
is the principle governing the reasonableness of presuppositions? How 
can a speaker predict, or know that his interlocutor shares or accepts the 
presupposed information? According to Stalnaker presupposition is defined 
as follows:
A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context 
just in case the speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes or believes 
that his addressee assumes or believes that P, and assumes or believes that 
his addressee recognizes that he is making these assumptions, or has these 
beliefs. (Stalnaker 1974: 200)
On this perspective, presupposition (Schwartz 1977: 248) is simply an 
assumption about the interlocutor’s common ground. How can a speaker 
know or assume that a proposition is shared by the hearer? How would it 
be possible to presuppose proposition which are known not to be shared, 
without the sentence being meaningless? The possible answer can be found 
in analyzing presupposition as a speech act of a kind. 
2.1 Presuppositions as presumptions
Presupposing a proposition amounts to performing an implicit speech 
act. The speaker subordinates the felicity of his move to the listener’s 
acceptance of some conditions. Ducrot described presupposition as the 
conditions which need to be fulfilled in order to satisfy the pretension 
of carrying out an effect on the listener (see Ducrot 1966). If they fail, 
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namely if the interlocutor rejects them, the move is void, or rather is not 
a move anymore. Such conditions limit the field of the possible moves 
of the interlocutor: if he accepts the assertion that “I have met Pierre this 
morning”, he also accepts a conversational situation in which the topic is 
Pierre. On the contrary, the refusal of the presuppositions of a speech act 
amounts to rejecting the dialogue game. Ducrot explained this relationship 
between the possible moves and the presuppositions introducing the notion 
of act of presupposing (Ducrot 1968: 87). On his view, speech acts need 
to be divided in an explicit act of stating (the posé) and an implicit act of 
presupposing (the présupposé). This latter act deploys the possible moves 
that can be performed by the interlocutor, or the possible dialogical world: 
The set of all the presuppositions made by a person in a given context 
determines a class of possible worlds, the ones consistent with all the 
presuppositions. This class sets the boundaries of the linguistic situation. 
(Stalnaker 1970: 280)
On this perspective, the speaker can treat a proposition as part of the 
common ground even if it is not. While assertion can be counted as a 
proposal of adding a proposition p to the shared propositions (see Von 
Fintel 2008: 139), presupposition can be considered as the act of treating 
p as already shared (see Horn & Ward 2004: xii; Atlas 2004; Lewis 1989: 
339). Such an act does not depend on what the interlocutors share: it is 
possible to presuppose a proposition that has been assumed as not shared, 
without incurring a communication failure (Burton-Roberts 1989: 26). The 
possibility of treating as shared a proposition that is actually not granted or 
that belongs to the common knowledge depends on the phenomenon called 
“accommodation” (see Lewis 1979; Von Fintel 2008). Accommodation was 
described by Lewis as a process of adjustment of the common ground, in 
which the presupposed proposition, needed for the communicative move to 
be meaningful, comes into existence when not previously known:
If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable 
and if P is not presupposed just before t, then—ceteris paribus and within 
certain limits—presupposition P comes into existence at t. (Lewis 1979: 
340)
The crucial problem is to determine how a presupposition can come into 
existence and be added to the shared propositions. On Soames’ view, 
accommodation is possible when no objections are raised, and more 
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specifically, when the interlocutor has already accepted the proposition or 
the presupposition is not conflicting with the listener’s common ground:
Utterance Presupposition: An utterance U presupposes P (at t) iff one can 
reasonably infer from U that the speaker S accepts P and regards it as 
uncontroversial, either because 
a. S thinks that it is already part of the conversational context at t, or 
because 
b. S thinks that the audience is prepared to add it, without objection, to the 
context against which U is evaluated. (Soames 1982: 486)
Soames describes the phenomenon of accommodation in terms of speaker’s 
beliefs regarding the interlocutor’s common knowledge. However, this 
account cannot explain how it is possible to describe a belief as good or bad, 
and therefore it does not provide a criterion for assessing presuppositions. 
A possible suggestion for explaining differently the problem of 
presupposition accommodation can be found in Stalnaker (1998). He 
maintains that the speaker can only presume that the presupposed information 
is available to his or her audience (see Stalnaker 1998: 8). He claims that a 
speaker can presuppose a proposition only because he or she can conclude 
that the interlocutor can retrieve such information (on Green’s view, he 
assumes the knowledge, see Green 1989). For instance, Stalnaker (1998: 9) 
provides the following example: 
1. I can’t come to the meeting—I have to pick up my cat at the veterinarian.
The possibility of presupposing the speaker’s possession of a cat depends 
on the presumption that “usually people have pets” and that the interlocutor 
shares a culture in which such a habit exists. It would be more controversial 
to say: 
2. I have to pick up my Martian friend at the Voodoo club. 
Here the premise “people have Martian friends”, needed to the interlocutor 
to reconstruct the presupposition, cannot be presumed.
2.2 Presumptions and presuppositions
From the speaker’s viewpoint, it is possible and reasonable to presuppose 




[…] the mark of common knowledge is that everyone, or virtually everyone, in an 
historical or cultural situation believes that statement. As we argued […], common 
knowledge is presumptively reliable. 
 
The speaker presumes that the hearer accepts or already knows a given piece of 
information on the basis of shared and commonly known rules (Kauffeld 1995: 509) 
such as “Habits are generally known in a given community” or “Important news are 
usually known”. On this perspective, a speaker can utter that, “The king of France is 
bald” based on the presumption that “Information about an important country is known” 
and the classification of France as an “important nation”. Similarly, he can tell to a 
friend that, “I have met Bob yesterday” because he is acting on the presumptions that 
“Common friends are known” and that “Information relative to a friends is interesting”, 
and relying on the reasoning from classification leading to the conclusion that “Bob is a 
common friend” (Kauffeld 2003: 140; cf. Kauffeld 1995: 510). We can represent the 






�� H does not know P.
�� H is intrerested in P.
Dialogical move:
Assertion (P): I have
met Bob yesterday.
Presumed goal: inform H
Move: provide information
about a matter of interest.
Presupposition of Assertion
1. H knows Bob.
2. H is interested in Bob.




Rule of presumption 2:
Information relative to a
friends is interesting.
Classification:
Bob is a common
friend.
Classification:
Bob is a common
friend.
Presupposition 1: Knowledge Presupposition 2: interest
 
Figure 1: Presumptive structure of speaker’s presuppositions 
 
This account of presupposition as presumptive reasoning can explain the grounds of 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of taking a proposition for granted. Unlike Ducrot, 
we maintain that the reasonableness of presupposing depends on the conditions of the 
reasoning underlying such an act. This process describes the speaker’s perspective; in 
order to understand the evaluation of presuppositions we need to confront speaker’s 
or known. However, belief needs to be generated by a rational process or 
mechanism (see Freeman 2005: 43); in case of presuppositions, we can 
believe that the other party may know a proposition on the basis of his 
previous declarations (testimony) or dialogues with other people, or because 
it is part of the so-called common knowledge. As Freeman put it (Freeman 
2005: 346):
(…) the mark of common knowledge is that everyone, or virtually everyone, 
in an historical or cultural situation believes that statement. As we argued 
(…) common knowledge is presumptively reliable.
The speaker presumes that the hearer accepts or already knows a given piece 
of information on the basis of shared and commonly k own rules (Kauffeld 
1995: 509) such as “Habits are generally known in a given community” or 
“Important news are usually known”. On this perspective, a speaker can utter 
that, “The king of France is bald” based on the presumption that “Information 
about an important country is known” and the classification of France as an 
“important nation”. Similarly, he can tell to a friend that, “I have met Bob 
yesterday” because he is acting on the presumptions that “Common friends 
are known” and that “Information relative to a friends is interesting”, and 
relying on the reasoning from classification leading to the conclusion that 
“Bob is a common friend” (Kauffeld 2003: 140; cf. Kauffeld 1995: 510). We 
can represent the presumptive structure of presupposition as follows:
Figure 1: Presumptive structure of speaker’s presuppositions
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This account of presupposition as presumptive reasoning can explain th r unds of 
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This account of presupposition as presumptive reasoning can explain the 
grounds of reasonableness or unreasonableness of taking a proposition for 
granted. Unlike Ducrot, we maintain that the reasonableness of presupposing 
depends on the conditions of the reasoning underlying such an act. This process 
describes the speaker’s perspective; in order to understand the evaluation of 
presuppositions we need to confront speaker’s presumption with the process 
of reconstruction, or accommodation, carried out by the listener. 
3. Accommodating presuppositions: possibility,
 acceptability and reasonableness
When the listener interprets a speech act, he needs to reconstruct the missing 
information taken for granted. This process of accommodation sometimes 
cannot be carried out, but also when it is successful the communication 
move can be infelicitous, or a further process of interpretation is needed to 
retrieve its purpose. For instance, we can consider the following sentences: 
3. Bob is a really nice person (the listener does not know who Bob is).
4. I have brought my dog to the veterinary. 
5. My dog got an A in Math.
6. Just let me park my Bentley and I will reach you (I have just bought 
the car).
These three sentences represent the possible outcomes of the process of 
accommodation, and more importantly, of the assessment of the accommodated 
propositions. (3) cannot be accommodated, as the listener does not know who 
Bob is. (4) can be reasonably used to perform an utterance provided that the 
listener does not know that the speaker has not a dog. (5) cannot be reasonably 
used to perform a speech act, as its presupposition cannot be accepted. (6) 
constitutes a particular type of assertion, in which the listener can retrieve the 
presupposition, even though he cannot possibly know such information. In 
this latter case, in order to save the meaningfulness of the move, he needs to 
interpret the utterance aimed at communicating the very information taken for 
granted.1 In order to describe how presupposition works and the conditions of 
its failure, we can distinguish between four cases:
i) the presupposition cannot be accommodated; 




iii) the presupposition can be accommodated but not accepted;
iv) the presupposed proposition, even if can be accommodated, cannot 
be considered as a condition, but rather the information which the 
speaker intends to convey.
In (3) the presupposition cannot be even reconstructed, as the listener cannot 
retrieve from the sentence and background knowledge the needed information 
about Bob. In (4) the speaker reasonably subordinates the meaningfulness of 
the sentence to the knowledge or reconstruction of the factual presupposition 
“I have a dog”, which can be shared by, not known, or known to be false 
by the interlocutor. In the first and second case it is acceptable, while in the 
third case, even though it can be accommodated, it cannot be accepted. In 
(5) the categorical conditions of felicity of the communicative move are 
not acceptable, as dogs by definition are not reasonable animals. In (6) the 
speaker can take for granted the information that “I have a Bentley”, as it is 
retrievable and acceptable; however, he behaves unreasonably by taking for 
granted information which cannot be shared. The difference in the acts can 
be explained considering the distinction between possibility, acceptability, 
and reasonableness of presupposition. 
The first crucial problem is to understand why and how a presupposition 
is possible, when and how it can be reconstructed. Asher and Lascarides 
pointed out how the mere concept of adding a proposition to a context 
cannot explain why and how some presuppositions can be accommodated 
and why others cannot. As they put it (Asher & Lascarides 1998: 255), 
“presuppositions must always be rhetorically bound to the context, rather 
than added”. Presuppositions need to be related to the propositions already 
known, from which they may be derived through defeasible reasoning 
(Hobbs 1979; Asher & Lascarides 1998: 277). Interpreting this position, we 
can say that the possibility of reconstructing the presuppositions depends 
on the possibility of triggering reasoning from the linguistic and pragmatic 
data provided leading to the missing presupposition. For instance, we can 
compare the aforementioned sentences with the following: 
7. Bob was at the party too (no parties were mentioned before).
Let’s consider such sentence as uttered in a context in which no parties 
and no guests have been previously mentioned. The presuppositions that 
“Hearer knows which party I am talking about” (triggered by “the”) and 
“Other people were at the party” (triggered by “too”) cannot be reconstructed 
without a specific dialogical context. Unless the party and eventually 
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Bob can be identified through the context, the presuppositions cannot be 
reconstructed and the meaning cannot be even retrieved. The hearer can 
obtain the information that there was a party and that there were other 
people at the party as they are “implicit contents” of the sentence (Bach 
1999); however, if he does not know that there was a party, he or she cannot 
reconstruct the information “the aforementioned party” triggered by the 
determinative article. Considering our examples above, the presuppositions 
of both (4) and (6) can be reconstructed and accepted. The lexical and 
syntactical structure of, “I have brought my dog to the veterinary” specifies 
the following information: 1. the dog must exist; 2. the dog must be mine; 
3. the dog must be a physical entity; and 4. the veterinary must be a place. 
In “I will park my Bentley” the following propositions are “implicitly 
expressed” (Bach, 1999): 1. the Bentley is a car; 2. the Bentley is mine.
Reconstruction is not the only process which needs to be considered for 
analyzing presuppositions, as (3) and (7) do not represent the only cases in 
which the speech act fails because of presuppositional failure. Also in (5) 
we can notice a failure in the presuppositions; however, it is different in 
nature. In (3) and (7) it is impossible to reconstruct the presuppositions; in 
(5) the presuppositions can be reconstructed, but the hearer cannot accept 
them. We can represent the reconstructed information as follows:
Figure 2: Reconstructing unacceptable presuppositions
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My dog got an A in
Maths.
Maths is a subject of
study.
If someone gets a mark in a
subject he or she needs to
have studied such subject.
A is a mark.
Only human beings
study.The dog studied Maths.
The dog is a human
being.
My dog got a mark in










Figure 2: Reconstructing unacceptable presuppositions 
 
In this case, a reasonable hearer cannot accept that the dog is a human being. The whole 
sentence is not meaningful, as its condition fails. In connectors and higher-level 
predicates, the process of reconstruction and assessment works in a similar fashion, but 
the presupposed information is more complex as it refers to connection between states 
of affairs, such as in the following case (Carston 2002: 108):  
 
8. Bob is nice, but he drives a Ford Capri.  
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In this case, a reasonable hearer cannot accept that the dog is a human being. 
The whole sentence is not meaningful, as its condition fails. In connectors 
and higher-level predicates, the process of reconstruction and assessment 
works in a similar fashion, but the presupposed information is more complex 
as it refers to connection between states of affairs, such as in the following 
case (Carston 2002: 108):
8. Bob is nice, but he drives a Ford Capri. 
The connector “but” presupposes that the event referred to by the second 
conjunct is a sign of “being not nice”. This proposition can be reconstructed, 
but it is not commonly shared. In this case, its acceptability depends on the 
possibility of explaining the relationship between a value judgment on the 
driver and the car he drives. We can represent such a process as follows:
Figure 3: Reconstructing presuppositions/connectors
In this case, the presupposition is reconstructed by specification through 
the meaning of the conjuncts, and it is assessed against the acceptability 
of its possible explanations. Depending on the context, and therefore 
the acceptability of the possible explanations, the utterance will be 
 
The connector “but” presupposes that the event referred to by the second conjunct is a 
sign of “being not nice”. This proposition can be reconstructed, but it is not commonly 
shared. In this case, its acceptability depends on the possibility of explaining the 
relationship between a value judgment on the driver and the car he drives. We can 
represent such a process as follows:  
 
EXPLANATIONS
1. Usually who drives a
Ford Capri is not nice.
2. Ford Capri are sold
only to bad people.
3. Driving a Ford Capri is
a sign of not being nice.
2. Bob drives a Ford Capri
PREDICATE
BUT
(pp: 2 is conflicting with 1)
PP
2 is conflicting with
“being nice”
1. Bob is nice
PP
A Bob’s behaviour is 
conflicting with “being nice”
PP
2 denotes a Bob’s 
behaviour.
PP
Bob’s driving a Ford Capri is a 
sign or cause of “not being nice”.
 
 
Figure 3: Reconstructing presuppositions―Connectors 
 
In this case, the presupposition is reconstructed by specification through the meaning of 
the conjuncts, and it is assessed against the acceptability of its possible explanations. 
Depending on the context, and therefore the acceptability of the possible explanations, 
the utterance will be meaningful or void. These cases show that another element needs 
to be considered as essential for a presupposition to be possible, the acceptability of the 
presupposed propositions. Not only needs the hearer to be able to derive the missing 
information from the semantic, syntactic, pragmatic and discursive conditions that the 
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meaningful or void. These cases show that another element needs to be 
considered as essential for a presupposition to be possible, the acceptability 
of the presupposed propositions. Not only needs the hearer to be able to 
derive the missing information from the semantic, syntactic, pragmatic 
and discursive conditions that the predicates impose on their arguments, 
but the presuppositions also need not to conflict with what is commonly 
known and accepted, or with the propositions that the hearer knows to be 
true or acceptable. The product of the derivation or specification of the 
presuppositions needs to be confronted with the process of explanation, 
which is part of the assessment of the presupposition (see also Hobbs, 
Stickel, Martin & Edwards 1988 for a different account of reconstruction 
and evaluation).
The possibility of presupposing needs therefore to be distinguished 
from the acceptability of a proposition taken for granted. As seen above, 
the process of reconstructing a presupposition consists of a chain of 
reasoning from the sentence structure; such reasoning may be grounded 
on four different types of principles of inference: 1. undefeasible rules 
of reasoning (if x is an object, x has a surface; if x studies then x is 
a human being); 2. defeasible but commonly accepted propositions (if 
there is a party, then there are guests; if x is an adult then x may have a 
car); 3. conditionals known to be false (if x studies then x can be a dog); 
4. defeasible and not shared conditionals (if x is tall then x is rich). Such 
difference can explain why (3) is meaningful, while (4) is unsound and 
(9) below is ridiculous:
9. Bob is tall. Therefore he is really rich.
The last crucial problem regarding the foundation of presupposition 
concerns the reasonableness of speaker’s presupposition. In our 
epistemological analysis we have only considered a sentence as a fact, 
and not as an act. If we analyze presuppositions as acts performed by a 
speaker, we need to find an answer to the crucial question, why and how 
can a speaker presuppose a proposition? Stalnaker in his first definition 
mentioned above explained speaker’s presuppositions in terms of belief 
of knowledge. However, such approach cannot explain why in some cases 
presupposing is reasonable, while in others is absurd, manipulative or 
ridiculous. A possible alternative can be developed from the analysis of 
presuppositions from an argumentative perspective. Instead of considering 
the concept of belief of the other party’s knowledge as the foundation 
of speaker’s presuppositions, we can conceive them as the outcome of 
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a process of reasoning. On this perspective, the speaker can presuppose 
what it is reasonable to be considered as known: the reasonableness of 
presupposing depends on the reason supporting the fact that a premise can 
be shared.
Such approach can account for the difference between (4) and (6). In 
the first case, presupposing that “I have a pet” is possible and acceptable, 
as it is grounded on a premise which is commonly accepted, “Usually 
people have pets”. The speaker can presuppose such information because 
it is a habit, and a common presumption is that habits are shared by a 
community. In (6), the speaker presupposes that “I have a Bentley”; but he 
cannot reasonably presume that the hearer can share such proposition. The 
only warrant bearing out such conclusion would be that “People usually 
possess Bentleys”, which is unreasonable and not acceptable. His reason 
to presuppose is not acceptable, and even though presupposing is possible 
in such case, it is unreasonable. Often such unreasonableness calls for an 
explanation; in particular, in (6) the unsound speaker’s presumption triggers 
a second meaning which Ducrot calls connotation.
Three facts need to be considered in the assessment of presuppositions: 
the possibility of reconstructing the presupposition, the acceptability of 
the presupposed information, and the reasonableness of presupposing a 
proposition. This account highlights a fundamental aspect of presupposition 
accommodation, that it is a double process of reasoning: the hearer infers 
a proposition as part of the common ground, and the speaker presumes the 
possibility of such an inference.
4. Dialogical uses of presumptive presuppositions
As mentioned above, presuppositions represent felicity conditions of 
a dialogical move, which can be possible or impossible, acceptable or 
unacceptable. From an epistemic perspective they can be conceived as 
presumptions, which can be reasonable or unreasonable. However, from 
a dialogical perspective we can notice that even when a presupposition 
is not previously shared or even not acceptable it carries out a powerful 
dialogical effect. The listener will try to reconstruct the presupposition 
based on his knowledge and presumptions, and when he cannot accept 
it, he needs to reject the move by advancing reasons. In order to analyze 
this dialogical effect we need to investigate the epistemic dimension of 
presumption, and show how it can be used mischievously to alter the 
dialogical situation.
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4.1 Dialogical structure of presumptions 
The concept of presumption is used to describe a particular type of inference 
based on general accepted principles stating how things usually happen. They 
are defeasible generalizations, and hold as true until the contrary is proven 
(see Rescher 1977: 26). Presumptions are forms of inference (see Ullman-
Margalit 1983: 147) used in conditions of lack of knowledge (Rescher 1977: 
1-3). For instance, if something has happened in a certain place the previous 
day, the place can be searched for evidence because it is presumed not to 
have changed meanwhile. Such inferences are therefore strategies to fill 
the gap of incomplete knowledge shifting to the other party the burden of 
providing the missing contrary information or data (see Walton 1996a: 29-
30). Their conclusion is recognized as refutable even though it has not been 
refuted at that point of the discussion (see Hall 1961: 10). Presumptions are 
grounded on principles of inference that need to be shared and based on the 
ordinary course of events; in particular, the presumed fact needs to be more 
likely than not to flow from the proved fact supporting it (for the specific 
notion of probability of presumptions in law, see Leary v. United States, 395 
U.S. 6, 36, 1969).
If we apply the notion of presumption to conversation, we can notice that 
discourse is based on presumptions. The speaker adopts a conversational 
behavior because he presumes that the interlocutor cooperates or does not 
cooperate. He conveys an intention through an action because such an action is 
presumed to be associated with an intention. He uses a certain word to convey 
a specific meaning because it is presumed to have that meaning (Hamblin 
1970: chap. 9). On the other hand, the hearer tries to reconstruct the missing 
information or presuppositions because he presumes that the speaker intended 
the discourse to be coherent (Hobbs 1979: 78). Speakers can also breach some 
presumptions, because they presume that the hearer will rely on a higher-level 
of presumptions. For instance, indirect speech acts or tautologies are based 
on the same mechanism of breaching presumptions related to the relationship 
between speech acts and intentions, and words and meanings. We maintain that 
interpretation is an argumentative activity that is carried out based on linguistic 
presumptions and breaches, or rather clashes, of presumptions.
4.2 Manipulating presuppositions
The analysis of speaker’s presuppositions as presumptions opens the 
possibility of explaining their force and assessing their reasonableness. 
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A false or unacceptable presupposition is dialogically a false or 
unacceptable presumption, which needs to be rebutted. The listener, in 
order not to be committed to the presupposed proposition (Walton 1999: 
380; Corblin 2003) needs to rebut the speaker’s move, by attacking either 
the principle of presumption or the reasoning underlying the passage from 
the presumption to the proposition. For instance, considering figure 1 
above, the speaker can reject the presumption that information relative to 
a friend is interesting, or the fact that Bob is a common friend. Assessing 
the presumptive reasoning underlying presupposition and showing 
its dialogical effect is necessary in order to understand when and why 
presuppositions are used to deceive and alter the perspective or reality. 
The speaker may use presuppositions to manipulate the interlocutor 
in two fashions: by taking advantage of the other party’s ignorance or 
exploiting the ambiguity of a concept.
In the first case the speaker can presuppose (presume the knowledge of) 
an unshared or new definition of a concept, or unshared facts. For instance 
we can consider the following sadly famous use of a word with an unshared 
meaning (Lifton 1986: 42):
Manipulation Case 1: Presupposing new definitions:
The Nazis had programs of positive and negative Eugenics.
The meaning of “positive and negative eugenics” was not known at the 
time; its definition was simply presupposed, or rather presumed to be shared 
by the people. Such information could be retrieved by the known meaning 
of “eugenics” (“strengthening a biological group on the basis of ostensible 
hereditary worth”—Lifton 1986: 24), but could not be traced back to the 
real definition of “sterilization of unhealthy individuals or racially inferior 
people and sometimes euthanasia”. The other use of the first strategy is the 
use of words to presuppose unshared and false information. For instance we 
can compare the following controversial case.2
Manipulation Case 2:
“Ground Zero Mosque”: That three-word phrase has the dubious distinction 
of being inaccurate not once but twice. The project in question is not actually 
being planned at Ground Zero—it’s planned to go up two blocks away, at the 
former location of a Burlington Coat Factory that lacks a view of the former 
site of the Twin Towers. And it’s not, strictly speaking, a mosque—it’s an 
Islamic cultural center that includes a swimming pool, basketball court, 
restaurant and a prayer room.
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In this case, an Islamic cultural center, planned to be built near the former 
Twin Tower site, was referred to as the Ground Zero Mosque,3 to convey 
the information that an “Islamic house of worship” was to be built at a place 
which has become a symbol of American identity, values, etc.4 The problem 
with this definite description is that it was used to presuppose that the 
building was planned to become a place of worship. Such a presupposition 
was unacceptable for two reasons: the center included only a praying room 
among other facilities, and, more importantly, the building was already used 
as a praying place.5 The strength of this move rests on the interlocutors’ 
ignorance of the actual plans and the past use of the building, combined 
with the emotional appeal to the Islamic threat.
The second strategy relies on the ambiguity of a word, used to presuppose 
a proposition without being committed to it, or letting the interlocutor 
know. The speaker can use a word having a specific presumptive meaning 
presupposing an unshared new meaning, such as in the following case 
(Lifton 1986: 51):
Manipulation Case 3: Introducing ambiguity:
Physicians can carry out euthanasia (to indicate direct medical killing of 
“lives unworthy of life”).
Euthanasia here refers to the killing of Jewish children; even though the 
idea of killing mental patients was considered as euthanasia, the word was 
presumed to refer to the killing of a man’s to relieve him from horrible 
sufferance (Lifton 1986: 49). The word was used with a new presumptive 
meaning, while the listener constructed it based on his presumption. 
The speaker can also use this strategy by relying on the already existing 
ambiguity and vagueness of a word. For instance, we can consider the 
following case:6
Manipulation Case 4: Using existing ambiguous words:
“The American People”: Politicians love to invoke the American people when 
talking about why their policies are the right ones. According to President 
Obama, Republicans have a “lack of faith in the American people” because 
they blocked an extension of unemployment benefits; according to House 
Minority Leader John Boehner, the president’s policies regularly “defy the 
will of the American people” in pursuit of a far-left agenda.7
The meaning of “American people” is ambiguous, and may refer to supporters 
of different political parties or ideas; obviously since the meaning is unclear 
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it may refer to different states of affairs. President Obama’s American people 
are not the Republican readers’ American people.
The two aforementioned strategies can be also combined: the speaker 
can presuppose a proposition that would be unacceptable (or incorrect) if 
stated, but by combining ambiguity and lack of knowledge its controversial 
nature can be overlooked:
Manipulation Case 5: Combining lack of information with ambiguity:
“Take our country back”: Sarah Palin is perhaps the most prominent 
Republican to call on her supporters to “take our country back”, which 
prompts the obvious question: From whom? According to liberal New York 
Times columnist Frank Rich, the phrase is a response to “the conjunction of 
a black president and a female speaker of the House—topped off by a wise 
Latina on the Supreme Court and a powerful gay Congressional committee 
chairman.”
In this case, the presupposition that “Latinos, Afro-Americans and 
homosexuals are not real Americans”, if explicitly asserted, would have 
been politically incorrect. However, such presupposition is concealed by 
uttering the slogan “take our country back” without providing a context or 
background information. The hearer or the speaker suggests a reconstruction, 
which can be always changed when challenged. Ambiguity and lack of 
knowledge are combined in such strategy.
In the cases of presupposition manipulation mentioned above, we can 
notice that much more information needs to be provided to rebut a false 
presupposition than to display it. The interlocutor needs to prove that 
such presupposition is false, while the speaker can always defend himself 
exploiting the ambiguity of the message. For instance, the “Ground Zero 
Mosque” conveys a particular value judgment, based on false presuppositions 
(it is an Islamic religious institution; it is on Ground Zero); however, such 
presuppositions are simply the result of a rational reconstruction, which can 
be always attacked (“I did not mean that”).
Manipulating presuppositions is therefore a tactic to alter the other 
party’s commitments and shift the burden of proof. Such a move is 
possible because the presupposed information can be reconstructed, but 
the listener’s assessment of it is altered. The listener may have not enough 
knowledge to assess whether the presupposed information is acceptable, 
or evaluates some information while the speaker is referring to a different 
proposition.
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Conclusion
Presupposition has been described in the literature as closely related to 
the listener’s knowledge and the speaker’s beliefs regarding the other’s 
mind. However, how is it possible to know or believe our interlocutor’s 
knowledge? The purpose of this paper is to find an answer to this question 
by showing the relationship between reasoning, presumption and language. 
Presupposition is analyzed as twofold reasoning process: on the one hand, the 
speaker by presupposing a proposition presumes that his interlocutor knows 
it; on the other hand, the listener reconstructs the propositions taken for 
granted and assesses them against the shared presumptions. The possibility 
of reconstructing a presupposition is distinguished from its assessment, 
where the consistency of the presupposition with the shared or common 
ground is evaluated, and its reasonableness established. The analysis of 
presuppositions from an argumentative perspective provides an instrument 
for evaluating the reasonableness of a presupposition and understanding its 
dialogical effect. On this view, the dialogical force of a presupposition lies 
in its presumptive nature, which sets and shifts the burden of proving its 
unacceptability or unreasonableness.
Notes
1 As Ducrot put it, in this latter case the utterance is used connotatively, that is, the 
simple fact that a sentence is uttered conveys a meaning (see Ducrot 1968: 44): it 
becomes a sign, from which the interlocutor can infer the conditions of use.
2 “The Most Loaded Phrases in American Politics” Cbs News | 16 September 2010. 
Retrieved 30 September 2010 from: http://www.cbsnews.com/2300-250 162-
10004783-5.html
3 “Peace-seeking Muslims, pls understand, Ground Zero mosque is UNNECESSARY 
provocation; it stabs hearts”, Palin wrote in a Twitter post Sunday. “Pls reject it in 
interest of healing.” The former Republican vice presidential nominee also posted 
a plea asking “peaceful New Yorkers” to “pls refute the Ground Zero mosque 
plan if you believe catastrophic pain caused @ Twin Towers site is too raw, too 
real.” Retrieved 5 May 2011 from: http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-19/politics/
palin.nyc.mosque_1_prayer-space-muslim-facility-ground-zero-mosque?_
s=PM:POLITICS
4 Retrieved 5 May 2011 from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Park51. For the 
presupposition, and ensuing reactions, that the center was planned to be built 
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at Ground Zero, see: http://www.cracked.com/blog/3-reasons-the-ground-zero-
mosque-debate-makes-no-sense/ (retrieved 5 May 2011).
5 Retrieved 5 May 2011 from: http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2010/08/18/ 
4922332-fact-check-islam-already-lives-near-ground-zero
6 “The Most Loaded Phrases in American Politics” CBS News | 16 September 2010. 
Retrieved 30 September 2010 from: http://www.cbsnews.com/2300-250_162-
10004783-5.html
7 See also the following conflicting statements, both supported by an appeal to 
the will of the American People: “It is a war that the great, great majority of 
American people supported, and my sense is members are approaching this very 
thoughtfully”; “The internal debate behind closed doors comes as the American 
people increasingly oppose the war”. Retrieved 30 September 2010 from: http://
www.eod.com/americanpeople
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